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I.

INTRODUCTION

"Admit it was a hardship, but it is not every hardship
that is unjust, much less that is unconstitutional . . ." 1
A movement is afoot to revise the longstanding presumption
that in civil litigation the producing party bears the cost of
production in response to discovery requests. An amendment to
Rule 26(c) which took effect in December 2015-makes explicit
courts' authority to issue protective orders that shift discovery costs
away from producing parties.2 But this authority is not new; 3 what
* Earle K. Shawe Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. The Legal Tender C ases, 79 U.S. (7 Wall.) 457, 552 (1870).
2. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c), ("The court may, for good cause, issue an order
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: . . . (B) specifying
terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or
discovery." (emphasis added)).
3. See id. committee note, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
R ulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf ("Rule 26(c)(1)(B) is amended to
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is new is what may be coming next-an undoing of the producer
pays presumption itself. Thus far, the sentiment to move in this
direction has been slightly below the radar, advocated by pro
business interest groups and advocates before the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules in letters urging the Advisory Committee
to place this issue on its agenda. A letter from the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce is representative of this movement:
We also suggest that as the Committee contemplates
proposals in the future, it should consider
amendments that address the root cause of our broken
discovery system: the rule that the producing party
bears the cost of production. This system, under
which a plaintiff can propound broad and costly
discovery requests on a defendant before there is any
finding of liability, not only encourages unwieldy and
costly discovery requests, but also runs afoul of a
defendant's fundamental right to due process. As a
result, the Committee should consider, over the longer
term, an amendment requiring each party to pay the
costs of the discovery it requests, subject to
adjustments by the court.4
The topic was treated even more extensively in a letter
addressed to the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (the Standing Committee) from John H. Beisner, a
include an express recognition of protective orders that allocate expenses for
disclosure or discovery. Authority to enter such orders is included in the present
rule, and courts already exercise this authority. Explicit recognition will forestall
the temptation some parties may feel to contest this authority."); see also, e.g.,
CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2013) ("Rule 26(b)(2)(B) limits discovery on electronically stored information
from sources not 'reasonably accessible,' and provides the court discretion to order
discovery and specify cost-shifting to obtain that discovery."); Spears v. City of
Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that even absent a party's
bad faith, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 grants of "considerable discretion in
determining whether expense-shifting in discovery production is appropriate in a
given case.").
4. U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Public Comment to the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Concerning Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 (Nov. 7, 2013).
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partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom who has testified
before Congress on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.5
After setting forth his argument that the producer-pays rule violates
due process, Mr. Beisner wrote:
In light of the due process concerns raised by the
current producer-pays discovery regime, the
Committee should consider additional amendments to
the federal rules. One solution would be to establish a
general rule that each party pays the costs of the
discovery it requests, subject to adjustments by the
court. 6
The Lawyers for Civil Justice, a self-declared proponent of "the
corporate and defense perspective on all proposed changes to the
FRCP," has expressly stated: "Our current federal rulemaking agenda
is focused on reining in the costs and burdens of discovery through
FRCP amendments [including] ... development of incentive-based
'requester pays' default rules."7 Needless to say, revising the default
producer-pays rule in this way would tum the current approach on its
head, presumptively saddling requesters with an ex ante burden of
funding the expense associated with responding to their discovery
requests. 8
5. See Examination of Litigation Abuses Before the H. Subcomm. on the
Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
(2013) (testimony of John H. Beisner), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
_files/hearings/113th/03132013/Beisner%2003132013.pdf.
6. Letter from John H. Beisner, partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, to Johnathan C. Rose, Secretary of the Comm. on Rules of Practice &
Procedure of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 2, 2014), [hereinafter
Beisner letter], available at http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp
_skadden_arps_slate_meagher_fl om.john_beisner_1.2.14.pdf.
7. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
http://www.lfcj.com/federal-rules-of-ci vii-procedure.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2015).
8. Critics of the producer-pays rules tend to argue that the expense
associated with extensive electronic discovery coupled with the belief that most of
the requested information is of little practical utility supports their desire to shift
those costs onto the requesting party. To what extent is this cost/abuse narrative
valid? Certainly, in some contexts-such as high stakes commercial litigation or
cases involving one-way fee-shifting-discovery costs can run high. However,
there is evidence that in ordinary cases the incidence of discovery as well as the
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Given indications that the Advisory Committee will indeed
take up the issue of cost-shifting in the context of civil discovery,9
now is an apt time to evaluate the producer-pays rule and the claims
of those urging its demise. Specifically, these questions are: To
what extent is the producer-pays rule imposing costs on parties in
litigation; are there fairness, policy, or constitutional considerations
that warrant a revisiting of the rule; and, ultimately, what would a
rational approach to discovery cost-allocation look like? In the
passages that follow, we will explore the current landscape of
discovery expenses in the federal system and the rules governing
their allocation (Part I), followed in Part II by an exploration of the
various purported difficulties with a producer-pays approach. Part
III will then build on these discussions to develop a rational
approach to cost allocation that appropriately balances the interests
of litigants on all sides of civil disputes in federal court.

associated costs tends to be lower than critics suggest. I recently addressed this
issue in more detail in A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice:
A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1730 (2013) ("[T]he
very source cited by the Court in support of its claim of a discovery problem itself
admits that discovery is nonexistent in 40 percent of the cases and is limited to
three hours in a substantial additional percentage of cases ... ."); see also Danya
Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1088-89 (2012) ("[T]he FJC reported that the
median cost of litigation for defendants was $20,000, including attorneys' fees. For
plaintiffs, the median cost was even less, at $15,000, with some reporting costs of
less than $1600. Only at the ninety-fifth percentile did reported costs reach
$280,000 for plaintiffs and $300,000 for defendants. The median estimate of
stakes in the litigation for plaintiffs was $160,000, with estimates ranging from
$15,000 at the tenth percentile to almost $4 million at the ninety-fifth percentile.
The median estimate of the stakes by defendants' attorneys was $200,000, with
estimates ranging from $15,000 at the tenth percentile to $5 million at the ninety
fifth percentile. . . . [T]he discovery costs that animated the Duke [Civil
Litigation] Conference organizers and participants did not appear to be, in the vast
majority of cases, significant or disproportionate.").
9. Private communication from those involved with the Advisory
Committee's activities confirms that discovery cost allocation will be an agenda
item over the next series of meetings. This should not be surprising, given the
success the corporate defense bar has had in getting other civil rules priorities onto
the Advisory Committee's agenda; the 2015 amendments are a testament to their
efficacy in this regard.
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THE EXISTING DISCOVERY COST-ALLOCATION LANDSCAPE

A.

The "American Rule"

Under the standard practice known as the "American rule,"
each litigant in American courts pays his or her own attorneys' fees
and expenses.10 This practice contrasts with the longstanding
approach in England (and most European countries) that has
supported fee and cost awards to prevailing litigants for
centuries 11 -a practice commonly referred to as the "English rule."
The American approach has been justified principally as an access to
justice device, meaning that the rule protects the ability of
prospective plaintiffs to bring actions that may vindicate their rights
and does not penalize defendants for merely defending themselves in
a lawsuit. 12 Conversely, English rule defenders tend to highlight its

10. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975) ("In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to
collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser."); Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) ("The rule here has long been that
attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or
enforceable contract providing therefor."); see also Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205,
2213 (2011) ("Our legal system generally requires each party to bear his own
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, regardless whether he wins or loses.
Indeed, this principle is so firmly entrenched that it is known as the 'American
Rule."'). This principle was first announced and embraced by the Supreme Court
in 1796 in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 1796 WL 896, at * 1 (1796),
("We do not think that this charge [for counsel's fees] ought to be allowed. The
general practice of the United States is in opposition to it, and even if that practice
were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it
is changed, or modified, by statute.").
11. Successful plaintiffs in English courts have been entitled to expenses
since the Statute of Gloucester in 1278, see Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1,
c. 1, while prevailing defendants gained this entitlement in 1607 under the Statute
of Westminster, see Statute of Westminster, 1607, 4 Jae. 1, c. 3.
12. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 714.
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is
at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing
included the fees of their opponents' counsel.
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purported ability to deter frivolous or weak claims while providing
full compensation for prevailing parties. 13 Most states in the United
States adhere to the American rule (generally speaking) , with the
exception of Alaska.14
Over time, the courts and Congress have created numerous
exceptions to the American rule at the federal level, particularly
regarding attorneys' fees. Numerous federal and state statutes
provide for shifting the prevailing party's attorneys' fees onto a
losing party in civil litigation. 1 5 The preponderance of fee-shifting
statutes tend to be one-way, meaning they impose attorneys' fees on
losing defendants more so than requiring losing plaintiffs to pay the
prevailing defendant's legal expenses. 16 The objective of these
provisions appears to be to encourage the private enforcement of the
Id. at 7 1 8 ; see also, e.g., R.M. Palmer Co. v. Ludens, Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501-02

(3d Cir. 1 956) ("It is clear that counsel fees should not be awarded as a matter of
course, nor as a penalty against the loser who followed conventional procedure.").
1 3. See, e.g., HB 1 45-Attorney Fees: Public Interest Litigants, Committee
Minutes, Alaska H. Judiciary Standing Comm., 23rd Leg. (May 7, 2003)
(statement of Benjamin Brown, Legislative Assistant, Alaska State Chamber of
Commerce at 1 :40 PM) ("The [Alaska State Chamber of Commerce] supports
Rule 82 [attorney's] fees because this modification of the English rule puts an
incentive into the litigation process that makes people not file frivolous suits and
realize that there may be a downside to their causing others to spend money to
defend a suit that is not likely to be prevailed upon."), available at http://
www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/HJUD2003-05-07 l 340.PDF; W. Kent Davis, The
International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States the
"Odd Man Out " in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361 ,
405 ( 1 999) ("The English Rule today reflects the rationale that victory is not
complete in civil litigation if it leaves substantial expenses uncovered.").
1 4. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 ("Except as otherwise provided by law or
agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded
attorney's fees calculated under this rule.").
1 5. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4(a), 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 5(a) (201 2) (antitrust cases);
42 U.S.C. § 1 988(b) (20 1 2) (civil rights cases).
1 6 . State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the
American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 32 1 , 322 ( 1 984) ("[T]he vast
majority of state attorney fee shifting statutes allow fee shifting only to prevailing
plaintiffs."). See also, e.g., The Clayton Act § 4(a) ("[A]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor [sic] . . . and shal l recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."); 29 U.S.C.
§ 2 1 6(b) (20 12) ("The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid
by the defendant, and costs of the action.").
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federal statutes in which they are found. 17 That said, fee-shifting
provisions that impose an obligation on plaintiffs to pay defendants '
attorneys' fees can be found within substantive statutory
provisions. 18
Other two-way fee-shifting regimes tend to be connected
with litigation conduct by either side that unnecessarily creates legal
expenses for an adversary, thereby justifying an equitable imposition
of such expenses on the culpable party. Examples of this approach
can be found within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at Rule 4
( expenses and fees resulting from the failure to waive servic e
without good cause) ,1 9 Rule 11 (expenses and fees resulting from
filings that violate the certification requirements of Rule 1 1) ,20 Rule
16 (expenses and fees resulting from noncompliance with court

1 7 . See, e.g., Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor America, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1 160,
1 1 7 1 (C.D. Cal. 201 0) ("California's fee-shifting and private attorney general
statutes incentivize counsel to take cases on behalf of plaintiffs who could not
otherwise afford to vindicate their rights through litigation."); Turner v. D.C. Bd.
of Elections and Ethics, 1 70 F. Supp. 2d I, 7 (D.D.C. 200 1 ) ("The fee shifting
statute is designed to create an incentive for 'private Attorney Generals' to bring
meritorious lawsuits by vindicating the citizens' rights when the government may
be incapacitated by political or budgetary considerations from bringing them.");
Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1 33 F.R.D. 4 1 , 43 (D. Nev. 1 990)
("[Title 15 U.S.C . § 1 5(a)] also provides for treble damages and attorneys fees,
creating incentives for private attorneys general.").
1 8. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1 988(b) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1 98 1 , 1 9 8 1 a, 1 982, 1 983, 1 985, and 1 986 of this title . . . the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . . "); 42 U.S.C. § 1 1 1 1 3
("In any suit brought against a defendant, to the extent that a defendant has met the
standards set forth under section 1 l l 1 2(a) of this title and the defendant
substantially prevails, the court shall, at the conclusion of the action, award to a
substantially prevailing party defending against any such claim the cost of the suit
attributable to such claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the claim, or the
claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous, unreasonable,
without foundation, or in bad faith.").
19. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(2) ("If a defendant located within the United States
fails, without good cause, to sign and return a waiver . . . the court must impose on
the defendant . . . the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of any motion
required to collect those service expenses.").
20. FED. R. CN. P. l l (c)(4) ("The sanction may include . . . an order directing
payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other
expenses directly resulting from the violation.").
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orders under Rule 16),2 1 and Rule 37 (expenses and fees resulting
from discovery misconduct), 22 as well as in the Judicial Code at 28
U.S.C. § 1 447(c) (expenses and fees incurred for an improper
removal),23 and 28 U.S.C. § 1 927 (expenses and fees resulting from
vexatious attorney misconduct).24 In the absence of express
authorization, courts have identified circumstances when they have
the inherent authority to impose fee awards on litigants.25 These
judicially-created exceptions to the American rule tend to involve
instances of bad faith misconduct or equitable considerations that
suggest the propriety of relieving a party of some or all of its
obligation to bear the costs of legal services in a given case. 26
With respect to ordinary litigation expenses beyond
attorneys' fees or the costs arising out of litigation misconduct, there
have been only limited deviations from strict adherence to the
2 1 . FED. R. CIV. P. 1 6(f)(2) ("Instead of or in addition to any other sanction,
the court must order the party, its attorney, or both to pay the reasonable
expenses-including attorney's fees-incurred because of any noncompliance
with this rule . . . . ").
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) ("Instead of or in addition to the orders above,
the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure . . . . ").
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1 447(c) (20 1 2) ("An order remanding the case may require
payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as
a result of the removal.").
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1 927 ("Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.").
25. Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 45 ( 1 99 1 ) ("[A]n assessment of
attorney's fees is undoubtedly within a court's inherent power . . . ").
26. The Court in Chambers explained:
[E]xceptions [to the American rule] fall into three categories. The
first, known as the "common fund exception," derives not from a court's
power to control litigants, but from its historic equity jurisdiction and
allows a court to award attorney's fees to a party whose litigation efforts
directly benefit others. Second, a court may assess attorney's fees as a
sanction for the "willful disobedience of a court order." . . . Third, . . . a
court may assess attorney's fees when a party has "acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."
Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
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American rule. At least since 1 853, Congress has authorized taxing
the losing party for specified costs.27 Today, a similar provision is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1 920 and Rule 54, under which "costs" such
as fees for the clerk, witnesses, printing, and copying are
reimbursable by the losing party to the prevailing party.28 Dismissals
for lack of jurisdiction can trigger an obligation of the dismissed
party to reimburse an adversary for such costs,29 as can appellate
affirmances for litigants who lose on appeal. 30 Under Rule 68 an
unaccepted offer of judgment that is followed by a less favorable
final judgment will trigger an obligation to cover the costs incurred
by the adversary from the time of the offer. 3 1 An important common
thread in each of these provisions is the traditional understanding
that the term "costs" does not ordinarily include attorney's fees,
unless otherwise provided for by Congress.32 Thus, Rule 68's
allowance for costs only permits an award of attorney's fees if the
underlying statute that animates the claim at issue defines "costs" to

27. Act of Feb. 26, 185 3, 10 S tat. 161 ("That in lieu of the compensation now
allowed by law to attorneys, solicitors, and proctors in the United States courts, to
United S tates district attorneys, clerks of the district and circuit courts, marshals,
witnesses, jurors, commissioners, and printers, in the several States, the following
and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed.").
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (taxation of enumerated costs allowed); FED. R. Clv. P.
5 4(d)(l ) ("[C]osts-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the
prevailing party.").
29. 28 u.s.c. § 1919.
30. 28 u.s.c. § 1912.
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d) ("If the j udgment that the offeree finally obtains is
not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the offer was made.").
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 provides nominal amounts taxable as "Attorney's and
proctor's docket fees," and thus provide a mild departure from the principle of
taxable costs not including attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (providing that
"[a]ttorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United S tates may be taxed
as costs as follows" and then delineating amounts of $5, $20, $50, and $100 of
such fees depending on the disposition of the matter, e.g., by trial, by
"discontinuance, " by appeal i n admiralty cases, or on motion for j udgment, and a
$2.50 fee "for each deposition admitted into evidence"); see also Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) ("[W]ith the exception of
the small amounts allowed by § 1923, the rule ' has long been that attorney's fees
are not ordinarily recoverable . . . ."' (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967))).
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include such fees.33 Absent the inclusion of attorneys' fees, these
cost-shifting rules have tended to be of minimal impact on
redistributing the financial burdens associated with litigation.34
B.

The Discovery Cost-Allocation Experience under the
American Rule

Notwithstanding the number of departures from the American
rule discussed above, that rule has remained the default principle
governing how the expenses associated with responding to discovery
requests are borne. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[u]nder [the
discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must
bear the expense of complying with discovery requests . . . ."35 This
means that ordinarily, when a party receives a discovery request
such as a request for documents under Rule 34--the responding
party must pay for all expenses associated with responding to that
request, which may include search and retrieval, photocopying,
forensic reconstruction, travel, human resources, and attorney
supervision and review. 36 As previously mentioned, attorney's fees

3 3 . Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 ( 1 985) ("[T]he term 'costs' in Rule 68
was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive
statute or other authority."). There was an unsuccessful effort in 1 995 to amend
the diversity jurisdiction statute to pennit the payment of an opponent's attorney's
fees after a litigant received a judgment that was less favorable than one previously
offered by that opponent. See ATTORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1 995, H.R.
REP. No. 1 04-62 ( 1 995), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT1 04hrpt62/html/CRPT- 1 04hrpt62.htm.
34. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 68 advisory committee's note (Proposed
Amendment 1984), available at 1 02 F.R.D . 407, 433-44 ( 1984) ("[Rule 68] has
been considered largely ineffective as a means of achieving its goals. The principal
reasons for the rule's past failure have been ( 1 ) that 'costs' [when they do not
include attorney's fees] . . . are too small a factor to motivate parties to use the
rule; and (2) that the rule is a 'one-way street,' available only to those defending
against claims and not to claimants.").
3 5 . Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 ( 1 978).
36. Rule 26(b)(4)(E) provides a notable exception to this default rule by
requiring "the party seeking discovery" to pay the fee of an opponent's expert for
the time spent responding to certain expert discovery requests (e.g. a deposition of
an opponent's expert). FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
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and expenses arising from discovery misconduct are potentially
reimbursable at the court's discretion under Rule 37. 3 7
Although producers must bear these costs, the bulk of
empirical data seems to indicate that overall, the costs of civil
discovery in the federal system are not disproportionate or
excessive,38 tending to suggest that for most litigants the need to shift
discovery expenses onto requesting parties is not compelling.
However, to the extent the anticipated expenses associated with
responding to a discovery request are thought to be excessive (either
in an absolute or relative sense) in any given case, the federal
courts-with some license and less guidance from the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure-have developed mechanisms for determining
whether some or all of those expenses should be shifted to the
requesting party.39 The inquiry currently employed by federal courts
involves a multi-factored consideration of issues such as the
proportionality of the expense, the significance of the information
sought, its availability from other sources, and the relative ability of
the parties to cover and control the costs.40 This analysis is typically
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (imposing "reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees" in instances of discovery misconduct).
38. I previously discussed the evidence rebutting the notion that overall the
costs of federal civil discovery are excessive in Spencer, supra note 8, at 1 729-3 1 ,
a discussion that pointed, in tum, to the work of the Federal Judicial Center and
other scholars, see Danya Shocair Reda, supra note 8, at 1 088-89 (201 2); EMERY
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv l .pdf/$file/dissurv
1 .pdf; Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1 993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L . REV. 525, 527
( 1 998); Linda S . Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1 3 93, 1 396 (1 994).
39. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 2 1 7 F.R.D. 309,
3 1 7- 1 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205
F.R.D. 42 1 , 428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (articulating the factors relevant to
determining the extent to which discovery costs should be shifted to the requesting
party).
40. Zubulake I, 2 1 7 F .R.D. at 322. In Zubulake I, Judge Scheindlin set out a
seven-factor test to be applied to cost-shifting determinations, which were
themselves a modification of factors previously laid out in Rowe:
1.

The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information;
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applied in the face of electronic discovery that is argued to be not
reasonably accessible,4 1 most likely due to the fact that Rule
26(b) (2) (B) specifically protects parties against having to provide
discovery from such sources when doing so would be unduly
burdensome or costly. 42 However, Rule 26(c) (l) (B) also provides
courts the authority to split or shift the costs of discovery-if "good
cause" is shown-via a protective order,43 an authority that is now
explicit.44 There was not widespread utilization of this authority
prior to the advent of electronically stored information (ESI) and its

2.

The availability of such information from other sources;

3.

The total cost of production, compared to the amount m
controversy;

4.

The total cost of production, compared to the resources available
to each party;

5.

The relative ability of each party to control costs and its
incentive to do so;

6.

The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and

7.

The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

Zubulake /, 21 7 F .R.D. at 322.
41. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake Ill), 216 F.R.D. 280, 284
(S.D. N.Y. 2003) ("It is worth emphasizing again that cost-shifting is potentially
appropriate only when inaccessible data is sought. When a discovery request seeks
accessible data-for example, active on-line or near-line data-it is typically
i nappropriate to consider cost-shifting.").
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) ("A party need not provide discovery of
electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.").
43. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting
that a responding party "may invoke the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c)
to grant orders protecting him from 'undue burden or expense' in [complying with
discovery requests], i ncluding orders conditioning discovery on the requesting
party's payment of the costs of discovery").
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2014) (amended 2015) ("The court may, for
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of
the following: . . . (B) specifying terms, i ncluding time and place or the allocation
of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery . . . ." (emphasis added)).

Symposium 2015]

RATIONALIZING COST

781

associated costs,4 5 although some courts have engaged in cost
shifting beyond the ESI context.46 Even with ESI, the imposition of
cost-shifting orders seems to be the exception rather than a standard
practice.47 Further, the costs that are shifted or shared under these
rules do not include attorneys' fees associated with retrieval and
production in response to discovery requests,48 although such fees
can be shifted as a sanction for discovery misconduct under Rule
26(g) or Rule 37.
Beyond the cost-shifting that occurs to alleviate production
expenses thought to be unduly burdensome, there is the statutorily
authorized shifting of the costs for exemplification and for "making
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for
use in [a] case" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 920 section 4. Under this
statute, courts may tax such expenses as "costs" awardable to the
prevailing party under Rule 54.49 This language unquestionably
applies to the actual photocopying expenses associated with
discovery but not preparatory costs leading up to the copying. 50 The
45. Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int'l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335-36 (E.D. Pa.
2012) ("Despite this broad authorization of cost shifting by the Supreme Court
over thirty years ago, very few Courts took advantage of this authority before the
advent ofESI.").
46. See, e.g., Simms v. Ctr. for Corr. Health & Policy Studies, 272 F.R.D. 36
(D.D.C. 2011) (relieving producing party of obligation to make photocopies due to
the associated expense and ordering requesting party to review and copy the
material at its own expense); Schweinfurth v. Motorola, I nc ., No. 1 :05-CV-0024,
2008 WL 4449081 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (ordering class action plaintiffs to
pay half the costs of requested discovery because of the size and limited probative
value of the information sought); Am. Int' l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-1,
Inc., 240 F.R.D. 401 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (ordering the plaintiff and defendants to share
equally the costs associated with discovery of a particular set of documents).
47. At least among published cases, o nline legal database searches do not
reveal a significant number of cases in w hich the discovery costs are shifted.
48. See, e.g., Melton ex rel. Dutton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., No. 4: l 1cv-00270-RBH, 2012 WL 4322520, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2012) ("[T]he cost
shifting contemplated by Rule 26(c) provides for shifting of discovery costs, not
the shifting of attorney' s fees."); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D.
568, 577 (N.D. I ll. 2004) (awarding shifting of certain out-of-pocket discovery
costs but providing that "[e] ach party will bear their own c osts of reviewing the
data ....").
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(l ).
50. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed .
Cir. 2013) ("But only the costs of creating the produced duplicates are i ncluded,
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Third Circuit has articulated the dominant view of how § 1 920
applies to the reproduction of electronic material:
[O]f the numerous services the vendors performed,
only the scanning of hard copy documents, the
conversion of native files to TIFF, and the transfer of
VHS tapes to DVD involved "copying," and that the
costs attributable to only those activities are
recoverable under § 1920(4)'s allowance for the
"costs of making copies of any materials. "5 1
In other words, courts have not read § 1 920 as a broad
authorization to shift all of the costs associated with electronic
discovery to a losing party but only the expenses associated with
reproduction.52 Section 1 920 is thus a narrow provision not seen as a
vehicle for broadly shifting the costs of discovery onto a losing
opponent.5 3
In sum, although there are multiple opportunities for litigants
to seek, and for courts to grant, the shifting of expenses associated
with responding to discovery requests, they remain limited and stand
as an exception to-rather than an upending of-the presumption
that producing parties bear the obligation to incur those costs.
not a number of preparatory or ancillary costs commonly incurred leading up to, in
conj unction with, or after duplication.").
5 1. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier R acing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d
C ir. 2012); see also Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc.,
718 F.3d 2 49, 260 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding the Third Circuit's reasoning persuasive
to not include imaging or metadata extraction costs).
52. See Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 171 ("Neither the language o f § 1920(4), nor
its history, suggests that Congress intended to shift all the expenses of a particular
form of discovery-production of ESI-to the losing party. Nor can such a result
fi nd support in Supreme Court precedent, which has accorded a narrow reading of
the cost statute in other contexts."); see also, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987) ("Although there may be strong policy
reasons in general, or compelling equitable circumstances in a particular case, to
award the full cost o f electronic discovery to the prevailing party, the federal
courts lack the authority to do so, either generally or in particular cases, under the
cost statute. ").
5 3. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012);
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 170 ("Nor may the courts invoke equitable concerns . . . to
j ustify an award of costs for services that Congress has not made taxable.").
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REVERSING THE PRESUMPTION: SHOULD REQUESTERS HAVE
TO PAY?

As noted at the outset, currently on the table is the question
of whether the presumption that the producing party pays the costs of
responding to discovery should be replaced with a default
"requester-pays" rule. 54 Note that a move towards the English
rule-which is a post hoc "loser-pays" regime saddling the culpable
party with the costs of the victor 's case-is not what proponents of
change have proposed. Rather, the suggestion is that requesting
parties should bear the costs of responding to the discovery requests
they issue ex ante as a matter of course, not as an exceptional
occurrence done only after a judicial assessment of the propriety of
such an allocation. Whether the proposal structures itself as a default
requester-pays rule or in the form of the traditional English rule55 is
material from a practical perspective (and to a lesser extent from a
policy perspective) but not so much so from a theoretical and
constitutional perspective. Below, we will review the various
constitutional and policy considerations surrounding the proposal to
move to a default requester-pays system in order to determine
whether such a course is advisable, warranted, or perhaps even
compelled.
A.

Constitutional Considerations

A principal claim made by opponents of the producer-pays
rule is that it is unconstitutional because it results in the deprivation
of the producer 's property-its financial resources associated with
the cost of production-"absent any finding of liability and without
adequate procedures."56 As Professor Martin Redish and his co
author have stated, "impos[ing] the nomeimbursable costs of [a]
plaintiff's discovery on the defendant on the basis of nothing more
54. See, e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
http://www.lfcj.com/federal-rules-of-civil-procedure.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2015) (urging the "development of incentive-based 'requester pays' default
rules").
55. Recall that the English rule is a post-hoc cost shifting mechanism
whereby the producing party is subsequently reimbursed if it becomes the
prevailing party.
56. Beisner Letter, supra note 6, at 8.

784

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 34:4

than the plaintiff's unilateral allegation of liability surely takes
defendant's property without due process" because these costs are
imposed "without even a preliminary judicial finding of
wrongdoing."5 7
These are serious charges5 8 with severe
implications: If this procedural due process challenge59 is correct,
courts would not be permitted to force producing parties to bear the
costs of responding to discovery requests, and such costs would
presumably become the responsibility of the requester.
To evaluate the strength of this due process claim, we must
begin with the meaning of the due process right. The text of the
Fifth Amendment is familiar: "No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."60 The Supreme
57. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery
Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 807

(20 1 1 ) .
58. Other scholars have derided this argument as "laughable" and not one to
be taken seriously because none of its proponents are invoking it as grounds for
refusing to comply with a discovery request in an actual litigation. That said, the
argument has been invoked repeatedly and likely will have rhetorical force that
will permit those already inclined to oppose the producer-pays rule to invoke it as
justification for making the policy change they desire-a move to a requester-pays
rule. Thus, it is important that the argument be taken seriously and evaluated
honestly rather than simply dismissed out-of-hand so that the results of the analysis
herein will be less assailable.
59. None of the proponents of the due process argument appear to be
claiming that the obligation to cover the expenses of responding to discovery
requests constitutes a violation of substantive due process-nor could they.
Substantive due process supplies heightened scrutiny only to impingements on
"fundamental rights" "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Washington v.
Glucksberg, 5 2 1 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1 997) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). No one could assert-in good faith-that the right not to cover the costs
of discovery production is a fundamental right. Not being a fundamental right,
rational basis scrutiny applies, meaning that the government action must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 728. The
government's interest in eliciting evidence in civil cases heard by the federal
courts is obviously a legitimate one and asking each party to cover associated
expenses-with the opportunity to challenge particularly burdensome costs-is
certainly a rational approach. See also Redish & McNamara, supra note 57, at 806
("[T)he forced subsidization of its opponent's discovery costs gives rise to serious
concerns about the procedural due process rights of the producing party.").
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment, which would apply
to action by state courts, similarly provides "nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
§ 1.
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Court has stated that the "central meaning" of this "procedural due
process" protection is that '" [p]arties whose rights are to be affected
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right
they must first be notified. '"6 1 However, these protections apply
only if there is a "deprivation" within the meaning of the Fifth (or
Fourteenth) Amendment.62 Thus, two issues present themselves
when confronted with the claim that the producer-pays rule violates
due process: First, does obligating a producing party to bear the
costs associated with responding to civil discovery requests
constitute a deprivation of the kind embraced by the Due Process
Clause? Second, if it does, is the party suffering the deprivation
afforded a constitutionally-sufficient opportunity to be heard in
connection with the deprivation?
1.

A Deprivation?

Our system of regulation in this country includes both public
and private enforcement mechanisms. The civil justice system, at
both the state and federal levels, is the principal means through
which private wrongs are vindicated. All persons and entities are
subject to this system, provided the requisites of jurisdiction can be
satisfied to give a court authority over the defendants in a given case.
Once lawful jurisdiction is established, all come under the obligation
to appear and cooperate with the judicial process-including
discovery-or face sanctions up to and including dismissal or a
default judgment. 63 Appurtenant to that obligation will be the costs

61. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68
U.S. 223, 233 (1863)).
62. Id. at 84 ("The right to a prior hearing, of course, attaches only to the
deprivation of an i nterest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment' s
protection."); id. at 86 ("Any significant taking of property b y the State is within
the purview of the Due Process Clause."); see also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1990) ("The first inquiry i n every due process
challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in
' property' or ' liberty.'").
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b); see also, e.g., Kafele v. Javitch, Block, Eisen &
Rathbone, 232 F.R.D. 286, 289 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that plaintiffs repeated,
persistent, and willful refusal to participate in discovery process despite earlier
sanctions warranted dismissal of action); Guy v. Abdulla, 58 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D.
Ohio 1973) ("[A] defendant may not completely refuse to participate in pre-trial
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of participating in that process, which include hiring counsel,
mailing and filing documents, hiring expert witnesses, producing
copies of requested information, and the like. Indeed, litigation
expenses (such as those just described) are an inevitable cost of
doing business in a society as reliant on private enforcement as the
United States.64 The question is whether the costs of compliance
with the judicial process-which are incidental to that process rather
than its object-can fairly be classified as a constitutional
"deprivation" such that the protections of due process apply to their
imposition.65
W hether such costs constitute a constitutional deprivation
depends on the ends they serve. To the extent that the litigation
expenses in question are expended for the benefit of the party
incurring the cost, no constitutionally-cognizable deprivation can be
said to have occurred. It is a well-established principle that property
employed for the benefit of the complaining party is not a
deprivation warranting due process protection. In Moody v. Weeks,
the court articulated this principle in rejecting an inmate's due
process challenge to being charged $5 per month to cover court
costs: "The inmate is not absolutely 'deprived' of his funds when
they are use[d] to pay court costs and fees because the funds are
being used for the inmate's benefit."66 In Jensen v. Klecker, the
Eighth Circuit stated the principle more starkly in terms apropos
discovery . . . ."). Of course, the complete failure to defend oneself in an action
risks a default j udgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 55 .
64. This is why under appropriate circumstances litigation expenses are
deductible against business income. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012).
65. Proponents of the due process argument, to my knowledge, have not
addressed this particular point, assuming-rather than establishing-that a
constitutionally cognizable deprivation occurs when a defendant is made to fi nance
the e xpense of producing information requested by plaintiffs in the course of
litigation. REDISH & MCNAMARA, supra note 57, at 807 ("To impose the
nonreimbursable costs of plaintiff's disco very on the defendant on the basis of
nothing more than the plaintiff's unilateral allegation of liability surely takes
defendant's property without due process. The judicial process has imposed a
fi nancial burden on the defendant without even a preliminary j udicial finding of
wrongdoing.").
66. No. l : 09-cv-332, 2009 WL 1728102, at * 2 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2009);
see also Browder v. Ankrom, No. Civ.A. 4:05CV-P9-M, 2005 WL 1026045, at *5
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 2005), ("[S]uch debits are not ' deprivations' in the traditional
sense because an inmate has been provided with a service or good in exchange for
the money debited.").
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here: "It is important to note that this issue does not involve a
forfeiture of property or a penalfr, Rather, it is in the nature of an
assessment for value received."6 Litigation expenses incurred for
the benefit of the litigant spending them are not being forfeited to the
government or to the adverse party, nor are they being imposed as a
penalty for a wrong; rather, they are funds a litigant spends in the
process of defending itself in court, a defense that provides a benefit
to that litigant. Thus, ordinary litigation expenses cannot be
characterized as a deprivation worthy of due process protection.68
But what of the costs associated with responding to a
discovery request? Is there something unique about such costs that
makes their imposition a deprivation that due process will recognize?
The short answer is no, for three reasons: First, to the extent that
producing information in response to a discovery request is
beneficial to the producing party, no constitutional deprivation has
occurred for the reasons stated above-self-servin� expenditures are
not classified as constitutional deprivations.6
Under what
circumstances would producing information in response to a
discovery request be beneficial to the producing party? Clearly, such
would be the case if the information produced were exculpatory from
67. 648 F.2d 1 1 79, 1183 (8th Cir. 1 981); see also Bailey v. Carter, 1 5 F.
App' x 245, 251 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We question whether the inmates were truly
'deprived' of their property, however. The copayment fee was deducted from their
accounts in exchange for medical services."); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1 281,
1 287 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Moreover, prisoners are not absolutely deprived of the use
of their funds when those funds are applied toward the filing-fee requirements.
The funds are being utilized for the prisoner's benefit j ust as a non-indigent' s
money is used by him to proceed in federal court.").
68. Professor Redish seems to concede this point in part when he writes,
[I]t is important to distinguish the burdens caused by the forced subsidy
[of the cost of production] from the normal costs incurred by a defendant
in preparing his own case after a complaint is filed. Unlike the costs
incurred by a defendant in mounting his own case, the costs involved in
responding to a plaintiffs discovery requests are a fi nancial benefit that
the defendant is required-at the risk of severe sanctions-to provide to
the plaintiff on the basis of nothing more than the unilateral filing of the
plaintiff s complaint.
REDISH & MCNAMARA, supra note 57, at 81 0.
69. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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the perspective of a producing defendant7° or probative of the
producing party's claims or defenses because in those circumstances
the information would be supportive of the producing party's
position in the litigation.7 1 As a result, the expense would be
beneficial to the producing party and thus not a constitutionally
cognizable deprivation.72
Conversely, the information produced may be inculpatory or
probative of the requesting party's claims or defenses and thus used
against the producing party. In this situation, Professor Redish and
his coauthor believe that producing parties are forcibly-without due
process-being made to subsidize their adversaries: "Because each
party bears the costs of producing the information that will be used
against it by its opponent, each party effectively subsidizes that
portion of its opponent's case.',73 However, when the information
produced tends to confirm the defendant-producer's liability (or the
meritlessness of the plaintiff's claims in the event the plaintiff is the
producing party) this analysis should fail because the producer has
unclean hands; a litigant should have no equitable claim to a right to
withhold information tending to refute its litigation position or to

70. Producing plaintiffs, having initiated the action, are likely not in a
position to challenge the legitimacy of having to pay to produce material in
response to proper discovery requests from the parties they have sued, given such
plaintiffs' own invocation of the discovery process to prosecute and support their
own claims.
71. This is a distinction that seems to be recognized, at least implicitly, by
advocates of a requester-pays rule in their failure to complain (in the context of the
contemporary debate) of having to pay the costs of producing documents pursuant
to the initial disclosure obligations of Rule 26(a). Those disclosures are expressly
limited to "information . . . that the disclosing party may use to support its claims
or defenses," i.e. information whose production is beneficial to the producing
party. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)( l )(i) & (ii) (emphasis added).
72. Such exculpatory information may not be exclusively beneficial to the
producing party; the information might also be of some benefit to the requesting
party's litigation position as well. However, so long as the information is of some
benefit to the producing party, the claim o f a constitutional deprivation cannot be
maintained.
73. REDISH & McNAMARA, supra note 57, at 792. Unmentioned is the fact
that the taxpayers, in tum, subsidize these costs through their deductibility against
tax liability as business expenses. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (allowing deductions for
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business").
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saddle the requester with the expense of discovering such
information.
More basically, though, the argument that having to bear the
costs of production in civil litigation is a constitutional deprivation
fails because if the information has evidentiary value in a live
dispute, the court and all parties are entitled to access it, and those in
possession of the information have a duty to provide it. As the
Eleventh Circuit once stated, "[t]here is a fundamental responsibility
of every person to give testimony, and the duty to provide evidence
has long been considered to be almost absolute."74 Further, this duty
obtains notwithstanding the fact that it may be accompanied by
burdens such as incurring expenses or opportunity costs. As one
court explained the point:
The Professor claims that having to produce his
records and give testimony would be burdensome.
He claims that to require him to be available in every
lawsuit would create an extraordinary hardship on
him and that the court should protect him. His claim
must be kept in context with the way in which the
system of administrating justice affects every citizen.
Every person is burdened by having to disclose
knowledge he acquires, even though it is acquired
purely by accident. A person who sees an auto
accident cannot refuse to testify because it burdens
him. A person who witnesses a will cannot refuse to
testify. All are burdened, yet some are burdened more
than others.75
Clearly, the mere fact of a financial burden arising out of
complying with lawful discovery obligations itself cannot constitute
a constitutional deprivation. What the Constitution protects against,
rather, is the imposition of unreasonable or excessive burdens.76 So
74. Klay v. All Defendants, 425 F.3d 977, 9 86 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) .
75. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
76. See United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 130 (3d
Cir. 1967) ("If the Fourth and F ifth Amendments accord any protection it could
only be from the imposition of an unreasonable and excessive financial burden.").
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long as the information sought is relevant to the dispute and the costs
of producing the requested information are reasonable, the expenses
are an ordinary incident of doing business and a constitutionally
cognizable deprivation cannot be said to have occurred.77
This test-whether the information is relevant to the dispute
and the reasonableness of the costs of compliance-crystalizes for us
the constitutionality of the default producer-pays rule in the federal
courts because the discovery rules are designed to ensure that
responding parties bear the cost of production only under these
conditions. On the first point-relevance to the dispute-the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permit only the discovery of information
that is "relevant to any party's claim or defense;"78 although a good
cause showing formerly could serve as grounds for expanding the
scope of discoverable information to material relevant to "the subject
matter involved in the action,"79 that allowance was eliminated from
the Rule. 80 Thus, the discovery requests to which parties have a duty
to respond are only those seeking i nformation relevant to a claim or
defense actually asserted in the action. On the second point, the
Federal Rules give producing parties the right to object to discovery
that would impose unreasonable costs.81
Currently, then, if the information requested is useless,
irrelevant, or too expensive, the Federal Rules afford a producing
party a process whereby it can challenge-ex ante, in an adversarial
process before an impartial judge-both the propriety of the request
and the producer's obligation to cover the expenses associated with
that request. Rule 26(c) entitles responding parties to seek protective
orders when that party believes it is entitled to protection "from
77. See United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Minn. 1 973)
("[T]he bank complains that the financial burden of compliance would be
considerable, such that it would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law . . . . Since the material sought by the Internal Revenue Service is
relevant to a legitimate investigation, the bank has the duty of full cooperation,
including the diligent search for and production of all records requested. The
expenses incurred in producing such records are reasonably incident to the bank's
normal operations and should be anticipated as a cost of doing business as a
bank.").
78. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l ) (2014) (amended 20 1 5).
79. Id.
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l ) (lacking language permitting such an
allowance).
8 1 . FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)( l ).
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annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense. "82 Thus, in the very circumstance when the costs and
benefits of the requested information are in question, responding
parties are not forced to pay for such information until after a hearing
on their objection occurs. We will return to an expanded discussion
of the constitutional sufficiency of this process below.83
Recall that we are exploring the reasons why bearing the
costs of producing information in response to civil discovery
requests is not ordinarily a constitutional deprivation. The first was
that productions that benefit the litigation position of the producing
party cannot be regarded as deprivations; equitable considerations
preclude complaints about the costs of giving information harmful to
one's litigation position; and when one might be able to claim a
deprivation-the obligation to pay for discovery that is unreasonably
expensive or not relevant to the dispute (or both) -the Federal Rules
provide for a prior hearing that can result in a protective order
against such an obligation. The second reason why the producer
pays rule is not a constitutional deprivation is that the Due Process
Clause has always been understood to apply to government
appropriations of, or impositions on, property or property rights, not
to adverse economic consequences that are the mere incidents of
lawful governmental action. Long ago, in the Legal Tender Cases,
the Supreme Court stated:
That provision [the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment] has always been understood as referring
only to a direct appropriation, and not to
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of
lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any
bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work
harm and loss to individuals.84
From that time, it has been clear "that the due process
provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect
adverse effects of governmental action."85 Thus, the incidental
82.
83.
84.
85.

FED. R . CIV. P . 26(c)(l ) (emphasis added).
See infra Part II.A.2.
79 U.S. (7 Wall.) 457, 551 (1870).
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 78 9 (1980).
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adverse economic consequences of enforcement of a statute cannot
be challenged as unconstitutional deprivations of property.86
Similarly, the incidents of complying with properly instituted judicial
action may not be cast as deprivations warranting due process
protections. This includes the obligation to comply with discovery
orders; if the court orders a producing party to produce information
relevant to the dispute, the expenses associated with doing so are
nothing more than "consequential injuries resulting from the exercise
of lawful power," not a constitutional deprivation.
Third, and most compelling, is the fact that giving evidence
in aid of a judicial process is a universal duty owed by all, entitling
none to a claim of compensation for the reasonable costs incurred
thereby. The Supreme Court clearly indicated that the giving of
evidence is an obligation. In Blackmer v. United States, the Court
wrote, "It is also beyond controversy that one of the duties which the
citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of
justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he
is properly summoned."87 Continuing in this vein, the Court in
United States v. Bryan noted, quoting Wigmore:
"For more than three centuries it has now been
recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public
. . . has a right to every man's evidence. When we
come to examine the various claims of exemption, we
start with the primary assumption that there is a
general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of
. .
g1vmg . . . .,,gg

86. Detweiler v. Welch, 46 F.2d 71, 74 (D. Idaho 1930) ("[A] statute should
not be rendered unconstitutional because the property of persons is subjected to
restraint, or that expense results to individuals from the enforcement of the
statute.").
87. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); see also United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 33 I (1 950) ("[P]ersons summoned as witnesses by
competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are
necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly o peration of legislative
and j udicial machinery.").
88. Bryan, 339 U. S. at 331 (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d
e d.) § 2192 (1940)).
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As a solemn public duty, the Court has admonished that "this
obligation persists no matter how financially burdensome it may
be. . . . 'The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary
contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public. "'89 As
such, there is no due process right to be compensated for the costs of
complying with the obligation to give evidence to a governmental
authority pursuing lawful objectives: "the Fifth Amendment does not
require that the Government pay for the performance of a public duty
it is already owed."90
Applying this concept in the discovery context clearly
precludes a claim of a due process problem simply based on having
to bear the costs of producing information within the permissible
scope of discovery in a civil action. When a bank raised such a
challenge in response to an IRS summons seeking the production of
certain business records, the court rejected the assertion that
"requiring the Bank to expend the funds required to comply with the
summons would amount to a taking of property without just
compensation and deprive it of property without due process of law"
and concluded that the bank had "no right to reimbursement under
the Fifth Amendment."91 That said, there does seem to be a need for
the incidental costs of compliance to be reasonable.92 As noted
above, the Federal Rules provide producing parties every
opportunity to object to paying the costs of production if they are
unreasonable and to do so prior to havin§ to bear the costs, in an
adversary proceeding before the judge. 9
So, again, when the
reasonableness of the production costs (or the relevance of the
information) is in question-which are the only circumstances under
which one might be exempted from the otherwise generally
applicable obligation to give evidence-the Federal Rules provide
for a process to resolve the matter. Thus, all that remains is to assess
whether that process is sufficient from a constitutional perspective.
89. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 ( 1 973) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 28 1 ( 1 9 1 9)).
90. Hurtado, 4 1 0 U.S. at 588.
9 1 . United States v. Covington Trust & Banking Co., 43 1 F. Supp. 352, 35455 (E.D. Ky. 1 977).
92. Id. at 355 (holding that respondents had no right to reimbursement
because "the summons imposes no unreasonable financial burden on the Bank").
93 . FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(l).
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A Constitutionally Sufficient Process?

Assessing the constitutionality of imposing the costs of
responding to discovery on producing parties in civil litigation only
partially depends on determining whether a constitutionally
cognizable deprivation has occurred. Any deprivation that might be
identified under such circumstances would have to occur in the
absence of the reqms1te procedural protections to be
unconstitutional. For those instances in which a litigant is compelled
to produce material to another party at its own expense, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure put in place an adversarial hearing at which
a judge will determine the propriety of imposing that obligation.94 Is
this a constitutionally sufficient process?
The Federal Rules limit the scope of discovery to information
relevant to a claim or defense95 and afford parties the opportunity to
object if a request exceeds that limit or would impose "undue burden
or expense."96 These restrictions cabin discovery within the
boundaries of what the government-through the courts-has the
right to demand of those who have evidence relevant to a pending
judicial proceeding. Recall that within these confines, no
constitutional deprivation occurs and all have a duty to cooperate
without compensation.97 However, the Federal Rules give producing
parties the opportunity to assert that the requested production would
fall outside of the permissible scope of discovery-either due to
irrelevance or undue burden-prior to having to produce the
information. This is done through a motion for a protective order;
movants have the opportunity to present their arguments against
having to comply with a discovery request to a judge.98 Thus, an
order compelling a party to produce material at its own expense
comes only after a pre-deprivation hearing at which the producing
party has had the opportunity to be heard. After this hearing, the
court may order the discovery if appropriate or order that the costs of
94. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c)(l ).
95. Id. In the current version of the Rules, there is no longer the ability to
obtain discovery related to the subject matter involved in the action. See supra note
80 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds for expanding the scope of
discovery that are eliminated from the new Rules.)
96. Id.
97. Supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(l ).
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such discovery must be shared with or shifted to the requesting
party.99
Is this type of hearing one that comports with due process?
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated a threefold inquiry to
assess the constitutional sufficiency of procedures that accompany
governmental deprivations of property based on Mathews v.
Eldridge: ( 1 ) consideration of "the private interest that will be
affected by the official action;" (2) "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;" and (3) "the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."1 0O
When the deprivation is at the behest of a private party, the third
consideration is revised to embrace consideration of the interest of
the party seeking the deprivation, along with "any ancillary interest
the government may have in providing the procedure."10 1
For civil discovery requests, the private interest to be affected
by the discovery is the financial costs associated with compliance .
However, s o long a s the costs are not unduly burdensome and are
connected with the production of information within the permissible
scope of discovery, no constitutional deprivation occurs. Further, the
hearing that Rule 26( c) provides minimizes the risk of an erroneous
deprivation because it permits a judge to assess the propriety of the
discovery request before the deprivation occurs, ensuring that it is
consistent with the relevance and proportionality constraints the
Federal Rules place on discovery. 1 02 Finally, the party requesting the
information has an interest in receiving it to the extent it relates to a
claim or defense actually raised in the action, as such information
will further their ability to prosecute or defend against asserted
claims. Similarly, the government has an interest in arriving at a
99. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(c)(2) (2014) (amended 2 015) ("If a motion for a
protective order is wholly or partly denied, the court may, on just terms, order that
any party or person provide or permit discovery."). There is now an explicit
authorization to order cost-sharing in Rule 26(c)(l )(B).
100. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
101. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. I , 11 (1991).
102. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 569-70
(1972) ("When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior
hearing is paramount.").
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resolution of the dispute on the merits, which can only be aided by
having access to information relevant to the claims and defenses
raised in the action. It seems beyond doubt, then, that in those
instances where having to pay the costs of production would
constitute a constitutional deprivation-the production of irrelevant
or unduly burdensome information-an appropriate pre-deprivation
hearing is provided consistent with what the Constitution requires.
As further protection, litigants only gain access to the
entitlements of discovery after surmounting additional procedural
hurdles that permit the dispute to be heard. Most obviously, civil
defendants must be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court
before being bound. 103 More importantly, defendants are obligated
to respond to complaints that meet the minimum pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a) as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In
the wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 1 04 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,105 plaintiffs must substantiate their allegations with sufficient
facts to make their claims plausible. 106 This obligation was
developed expressly to address the supposed prior ability of
plaintiffs to gain access to discovery on too thin of a basis. 107 The
need for plaintiffs to articulate facts showing plausible entitlement to
relief mirrors the similar obligation claimants had in Mitchell v. WT.
G rant Co., in which a writ of sequestration could only issue when
"the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appear
from specific facts shown by a verified petition or affidavit." 108 This
1 03. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 ( 1 9 80)
("Due process requires that the defendant . . . be subj ect to the personal jurisdiction
of the court.").
1 04. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
1 05. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
1 06. Id. at 678 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a c laim to relief that is plausible
on its face."' (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
1 07. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings. Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the
discovery process will reveal relevant evidence to support a § 1 claim." (citation
omitted)).
1 08. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605 ( 1974) (internal
quotations omitted).
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safeguard, among others, was deemed to be important in legitimizing
the deprivation occasioned by the writ in Mitchell, notwithstanding
the absence of a pre-deprivation hearing for the adversely affected
party. 1 09 In the context of civil discovery, plaintiffs have similarly
specified the plausibility of their claims and-as noted above-must
further demonstrate (if challenged) that the information they seek is
within the relevance and proportionality limits of discovery to a
judge. Thus, civil defendants in the federal system are compelled to
respond to discovery requests only in those actions in which
plaintiffs have demonstrated plausible entitlement to relief, not just
any claims that a plaintiff may have imagined, and only after a court
determines that the request does not fall beyond the proper scope of
discovery. An adversarial, pre-deprivation hearing before a judge is
the gold-standard o f due process and cannot be seriously challenged
as constitutionally deficient.
Although Professor Redish acknowledges the screening
function of the Twombly-Iqbal ("Twiqbaf') standard, he dismisses i t
as a constitutionally insufficient means o f protecting defendants
against the obligation to provide discovery at their own expense. 1 1 0
What he misses, however, is the fact that not all instances of self
financed compelled discovery production constitute constitutionally
cognizable deprivations. Professor Redish also ignores the fact that
prior to imposing production obligations that would constitute a
deprivation-the production of irrelevant or unduly burdensome
information-there indeed is an adversarial, pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral decision maker. Here, we make note of the
threshold Twiqbal pleading hurdle not to indicate its status as a
sufficient pre-deprivation protection against improper discovery;
rather, the pleading requirement is cited for the role that it plays in
ensuring that discovery is cabined by claims that have demonstrated
plausibility rather than claims that are purely speculative in nature.
That standard contributes to the assurance that the deprivation is not
erroneous; that is, by permitting only plausible claims to gain access
to discovery, the risk that discovery obligations are being imposed in
aid of meritless or baseless claims is greatly reduced.
It is worth mentioning that in addition to the pre-deprivation
hearing that a producing party may avail itself of under Rule 26(c),
109. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 6 05.
110. REDISH & MCNAMARA, supra note 57, at 807- 1 0.
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the certification and sanctions provisions of Rule 26(g) provide an
additional layer of protection against improper discovery requests
that would constitute a constitutionally cognizable deprivation.
Requesting parties must certify that their requests are consistent with
the rule, not interposed to needlessly increase the cost of litigation,
and are not unreasonable or unduly burdensome. 1 1 1 Violation of this
certification requirement subjects the offending party to the
imposition of sanctions, which can include the reasonable
expenses-including attorneys' fees-caused by the violation. 1 1 2
Not only does this provision have deterrent value to the extent it
discourages wayward discovery requests, it provides for a post hoc
compensation scheme that makes the producing party whole in the
event it incurs costs as a result of improper discovery requests.
Certainly, the protection provided by Rule 26(g) will depend on how
willing the court is to enforce it, a consideration to which we will
return when considering discovery reforms below.
In sum, only requests outside the scope of discovery or those
that are unduly burdensome constitute constitutionally cognizable
deprivations. The Federal Rules provide for a pre-deprivation,
adversary hearing before a judge to determine whether the discovery
sought falls within or beyond this permissible scope. Only litigants
who have demonstrated plausible entitlement to relief gain the right
to invoke discovery with respect to their claims. Litigants who in
fact interpose inappropriate discovery requests can be sanctioned in a
way that makes the responding party financially whole. Needless to
say, any effort to disparage this process as constitutionally
insufficient is baseless.
B.

Policy Considerations

Although there is no constitutional prohibition against
requiring producing parties to bear the reasonable costs of
responding to permissible discovery requests, that does not mean that
such an approach is the most appropriate way to allocate these costs.
The next question, then, is whether the producer-pays rule makes
sense from a policy perspective. More specifically, what are the
consequences of a producer-pays rule compared with a requester1 1 1.
1 1 2.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(l )(B).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).
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pays approach, and how do those consequences bear on litigants'
goals and on the goals we collectively have for civil litigation more
generally? Civil litigation is a mechanism through which civil law
enforcement objectives are achieved. These objectives include the
encouragement of law compliance (specific and general deterrence) ;
the peaceful resolution of disputes on their merits, the remediation of
harm (compensation) ; and--derivatively-the development of the
law. 1 1 3 A meta-objective would be the achievement of these
objectives in a manner consistent with due process and with
standards of efficiency and proportionality. 1 1 4 What role, if any, does
the producer-pays approach play in furthering or frustrating the goals
of civil litigation?
There are not studies to date--of which this Author is
aware-that study the impact of the various discovery cost-allocation
approaches discussed in this Article. However, there have been
numerous writings that address the relative merits of the American
rule versus the English rule, which allocate the overall legal
expenses associated with litigation. Unfortunately, empirical studies
attempting to measure the respective impacts of these competing
regimes are limited and have reached seemingly inconsistent or
inconclusive results. 1 15 For example, a Florida medical malpractice
study suggested that under the English rule-which applied to
1 1 3. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 426-27 ( 1 999) ("Civil
litigation accomplishes more than a simple resolution of the dispute . . . . [j] udicial
adjudication generates specific and general deterrence, educates the public, creates
precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values.").
1 1 4. FED. R. CIV. P. l (2014) (amended 2015) ("[T]hese rules . . . should be
construed and administered to secure the j ust, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."). Rule l now reads, "These rules . .
. should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, s peedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)( I ) (20 1 4) (amended 20 1 5); FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(l ) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case . . . .") (underlined portion indicates changes made).
1 1 5. Theodore Eisenberg et al., When Courts Determine Fees in a System
With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and
Defendants, 60 UCLA. L. REV. 1452, 1458 (20 1 3) ("Although a vast theoretical
literature exists on litigation costs, much of it need not be described here. The
literature has been reviewed elsewhere and is of limited relevance to this study
because it reaches few consistent predictions or prescriptions. ").
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medical malpractice claims in Florida-claim quality increased,
settlement rates decreased, and plaintiffs obtained higher
recoveries. 1 1 6 Another study focused on Alaska's loser-pays regime
found little effect to the extent that tort filings were similar to other
U.S. jurisdictions following the American rule. 1 1 7 An experiment
that sought to mimic American and English rule environments
demonstrated an increased likelihood of settlement under the English
rule, a result that runs counter to the Florida malpractice study. 1 1 8
Theoretical treatments of the topic have similarly yielded
inconsistent perspectives on the probable impact of varying
approaches to cost allocation. 1 19 One scholar seemed to suggest the
futility of attempts to make predictions in this area when he wrote:
[T]he current state of economic knowledge does not
enable us reliably to predict whether a move to fuller
indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of
litigation, let alone whether it would better align those
costs with any social benefits they might generate.

1 1 6. Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for
Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3 45, 378
(1 990) [hereinafter Snyder & Hughes, The English Rule]; James W. Hughes &
Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American
Rules: Theory and Evidence, 3 8 J.L. & ECON. 225, 225-26 (1 995) [hereinafter
Hughes & Snyder, Litigation and Settlement].
1 1 7. See SUSANNE Dr PIETRO ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL , ALASKA'S
ENGLISH RULE ATTORNEY'S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 8 1 (1 995)("[A]laska's
statewide tort filing trends resemble those in U.S. jurisdictions that do not shift
attorney's fees. The similarity suggests that fee-shifting in Alaska does not cause
differences between A laska's trends and those elsewhere.").
1 1 8. Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior
Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 1 6 1 , 1 62 (1 988).
1 1 9. Professor Herbert Kritzer summed this point up nicely when he wrote,
"There is surprisingly little agreement among those who have undertaken these
theoretical analyses. Some analysts argue that fee shifting should increase the
likelihood of settlement, while others argue that it will increase the likelihood of
cases going to trial. Some argue that fee shifting will decrease the number of cases
filed, while others argue that the numbers of cases will increase." Herbert M.
Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical
Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1 943, 1 948 (2002) (citing various
articles).
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The reason for · this agnostic conclusion is
straightforward. Legal costs influence all aspects of
the litigation process, from the decision to file suit to
the choice between settlement and trial to the question
whether to take precautions against a dispute in the
first place . . . . The combination of all these external
effects are too complicated to be remedied by a
simple rule of "loser pays." Instead, indemnity of
legal fees remedies some externalities while failing to
address and even exacerbating others. 1 20
I make no attempt to improve upon existing theoretical or
empirical assessments of the relative merits of the American versus
the English rule here. I offer the above brief overview simply to
indicate that we may not be able to obtain concrete guidance on that
issue as we seek to determine the optimal approach for allocating the
costs of civil discovery. That said, can we still attempt to reason
toward some conclusions regarding what the impact of various
discovery cost-allocation approaches might be?
Regarding the impact of discovery cost-allocation on claim
initiation and claim quality, it seems reasonable to assume that from
the perspective of a rational prospective litigant, the imposition of
greater costs on litigating a claim would permit that litigant to
proceed only if it could perceive a greater potential benefit to justify
those expenses. This perception of one's own claim quality and
likelihood of success may or may not comport with actual claim
quality, but at a minimum, the claimant must have some increased
measure of confidence in success to justify pursuing a claim at a cost
of x + n as opposed to a cost of x. For this to be true, prospective
claimants would have to have reasonably accurate information about
what those costs are likely to be, as well as some means of properly
assessing the merits of their respective claims. Further, the
magnitude of the increased costs-reflected in the likely discovery
costs the claimant will have to bear-would have to be sufficient to
matter to the decision to bring the claim; relatively negligible
discovery costs or costs that would be largely outweighed by a
recovery are less likely to deter the bringing of claims. Finally,
1 20. Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).

LAW AND ECONOMICS 64-65 (Boudewij n Bouckaert &
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claimants could reduce the costs they bore under a requester-pays
regime by modifying or narrowing their requests, which would
potentially lessen the deterrent effect of such a regime. As this brief
exercise demonstrates, the lament excerpted above that predicting
the impact of the competing indemnification regimes is a fool's
errand may have some merit: The array of factors, information
deficits, and contingencies that bear on the decision to initiate a
lawsuit may be too numerous, complex, and amorphous to isolate the
impact of cost-shifting on that decision.
Although this may be so, I would surmise that there is a
degree of discovery expense that, if placed at the feet of claimants,
could be sufficiently large to discourage the bringing of some
number of claims. It simply is unclear what that level would be in
proportion to the value of the overall claim (although I would guess
having to spend anything approaching, say, 50% of one's anticipated
claim value might begin to deter one from pursuing a claim at all) .
W hat is clear is that were such a level to be reached, the impact
would be the deterrence of some frivolous or meritless claims but
also of some number of legitimate claims, particularly those that
might have negative value (meaning the potential recovery is
outweighed by the expense of pursuing the claim) .
How would such an outcome impact the objectives of civil
litigation outlined above? On the one hand, the elimination or
reduction of frivolous claims would lessen the chance that litigants
who are not entitled to a recovery under the law will nonetheless
obtain a recovery due to financial incentives for the defendant to
settle-an outcome that would promote greater resolution of disputes
o n their merits. On the other hand, however, to the extent valid
claims would be deterred, under-enforcement would result. This
means that a larger number of law-violators would go unpunished
and thus undeterred, undermining the specific and general deterrence
goals of civil litigation. The remedial goals of litigation would also
be underserved, as actual victims would not obtain compensation for
wrongs simply because the costs of seeking vindication were too
high. All of this said, without being able to know where we are on
the over-deterrence-under-deterrence spectrum, it is difficult to
argue that more or less deterrence-through-cost-allocation is needed.
What of the narrower impact of discovery cost-allocation
rules on discovery itself? If we assume that the impact of these rules
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on case initiation and claim quality is indeterminate, might there be
an independent and discemable impact such rules have on discovery,
such as the overall cost of discovery, the number and scope of
discovery requests, or the production of information useful to a
resolution of the dispute on the merits? The goal of discovery is to
produce information that permits a resolution of the dispute on its
merits, which is an objective of civil litigation more generally.
Discovery rules that facilitate the production of relevant and
probative information further that goal, while rules that permit or
encourage either the concealment of such information or the
production of irrelevant information do not. Raising the costs of
seeking and obtaining information from one's adversary likely would
have the effect of forcing a party to narrowly confine its requests to
those which are most likely to be useful to the requesting party. 1 2 1
That is a positive result in one sense, in that frivolous requests for
information could be minimized. But an alternative impact could be
a chilling effect on requests that might prevent useful information
from being discovered, something that would impede the effort of
the parties and the court to resolve the case on its merits and, likely,
adversely impact enforcement objectives. A useful avenue for future
empirical research would be to attempt to assess the impact of cost
allocation rules on the discovery process itself. That said, it seems
clear that making it free to request information from one's adversary
does nothing to incentivize requesting parties to limit their requests
to the information they truly need. Indeed, requesting parties have
an incentive (albeit an improper one) 122 to request more information
of little to no utility given, that such requests impose costs on their
respective adversaries 1 23-costs that can alter the calculus of whether
to proceed with or to settle a case.
12 l . See Ronald J. Allen, How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their
Allocation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 885, 894 (2012) ("[P]lacing the costs of discovery
provisionally on the person asking for it . . . may . . . give incentives for the
optimal production of information . . . . ").
1 22. The Federal Rules prohibit making discovery requests for the purpose
of driving up an adversary's costs. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g)(l )(B)(ii) (requiring
attorneys to certify that a discovery request is "not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost
of litigation").
1 23. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 5 1
DUKE L.J. 56 1 , 603 (200 1 ) ("[T]he fact that a party's opponent will have to bear
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What conclusions, if any, can we draw from this brief
discussion of how the various cost-allocation approaches might
impact claim quality and the quality of discovery? It seems as if
moving towards either end of the spectrum between raising and
lowering costs for one litigant or the other simply modulates from
achieving more or less deterrence from bringing claims or
interposing discovery requests, which in tum may either frustrate or
facilitate our larger law enforcement objectives. Such a situation
calls for a balanced approach that takes the facts of a given case into
account to determine the most appropriate allocation of costs under
the circumstances. A flat rule that the producer pays under all
circumstances-regardless of relevance or the reasonableness of the
costs-would clearly be inappropriate, as it would permit requesting
parties to saddle their adversaries with sufficient discovery costs to
coerce them into acquiescing to their claims. But, a flat rule that the
requesting party has to pay the costs associated with responding to
its requests would be no less inappropriate, as such a rule would
deter meritorious claims and legitimate discovery requests, and
would permit producing parties to bury information in ways that
make its recovery cost-prohibitive, as well as incentivize responding
parties to drive up production costs as a means of burdening
requestors.
Fortunately, the current discovery system opts for neither
approach. Under the Federal Rules, litigants are not free to impose
massive discovery expenses on their adversaries with impunity.
Requesting parties are under an obligation to confine their requests
to the relevant and the reasonable or face sanctions. 1 24 Producing
parties can challenge compliance with those strictures before a judge
prior to having to respond. 1 2 5 Are these protections sufficient? The
fact that requested information might be relevant does not mean that
the information is necessarily going to be useful to the case. Further,
there will be times that relevant information will be costly to produce
and yet a court may deem that those costs are reasonable, meaning
producing parties will incur an obligation to pay significant sums to
respond. In this situation, should producers have to pay? Finally, if,
the financial burden of preparing the discovery response actually gives litigants an
incentive to make discovery requests . . . .").
1 2 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (g).
1 25. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
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after having borne the costs of production in response to discovery
requests, the producing party ultimately prevails in the litigation,
might that party justly claim entitlement to the reimbursement of
such expenses to be made whole? The next section fleshes out some
possibilities for modifying the current approach to allocating
discovery expenses that might address some of these concerns and
more rationally align with the objectives of civil litigation and
fairness to the litigants.
Ill.

RATIONALIZING OUR APPROACH TO COST ALLOCATION

As noted above, it may be difficult to assess the impact of
various approaches to allocating discovery expenses. My goal in this
Part is to articulate a framework for the rational allocation of such
expenses among litigants based on policy principles and fairness
considerations. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides a useful starting point, as it commands that the Federal
Rules should be "construed and administered . . . to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 126 In the
discovery context, this means that discovery should facilitate a
resolution of the dispute on its merits Gust), should not be unduly
time-consuming (speedy), and the expense associated with discovery
should be minimized (inexpensive). The Federal Rules further these
objectives by limiting discovery to information that is relevant to a
claim or defense, requiring that discovery be "proportional to the
needs of the case," and permitting producing parties to object to
unduly burdensome discovery and obtain a court order reallocating
associated costs.127 What additional measures might further advance
the goals of making discovery just, speedy, and inexpensive?
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 .
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (20 1 4) (amended 2015) ("Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged m atter that is relevant to any p arty's claim
or defense . . . . "); FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c) (2014) (amended 201 5) ("The court may,
for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . ."); FED. R. Crv. P.
26(b) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense andyroportional to the needs ofthe case
. . ." (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) ("The court may, for good cause,
issue an order to protect a party or p erson from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, i ncluding one or more of the
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Justice is served by the full disclosure of information that will
assist the court in resolving the dispute between the litigants on its
merits. But justice is disserved by discovery requests not designed to
yield useful information. Without commenting on the degree to
which such impositional discovery requests 128 are interposed (for
that is not knowable), it cannot be denied that the current rules
permit (practically speaking) such requests to be made. One way to
minimize the ability to make impositional discovery requests, of
course, would be to saddle requesting parties with the cost of
responding to those requests. However, as noted above, such an
approach could deter legitimate requests that might contribute to a
resolution on the merits. Further, making requesting parties bear that
expense could provide an incentive to producing parties to
manipulate such costs in a manner that unduly burdens the requester.
Below, I briefly introduce three alternatives to a requester-pays
approach that would better balance the interests of justice and cost
efficiency.
A.

Judicial Prescreening ofDiscovery Requests

One of the most promising alternatives might be to
reintroduce the judge into the discovery request process, at least in
cases in which discovery is likely to be (or is certain to be) expensive
and contentious. Prior to 1 970, parties had to seek court orders
to obtain discovery from another party and could only do so on
a showing of good cause. 1 29 The 1 970 amendment to Rule 34
eliminated the requirement to show good cause and removed
the court from the process so that the rule could "operate
following: . . . (B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of
expenses, for the disclosure or discovery." (emphasis added)).
128. I borrow this term from Frank Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery As
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637-38 (1989) ("[A]n impositional request is one
justified by the costs it imposes on one's adversary rather than by the gains to the
requester derived from the contribution the information will make to the accuracy
of the judicial process."). I do so without endorsing or embracing the range of
views propounded by Judge Easterbrook in the piece.
129. The pre-1970 version of Rule 34 read, "Upon motion of any party
showing good cause therefor . . . the court in which an action is pending may []
order any party to produce . . . any design ated documents . . . which constitute or
contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination
permitted in Rule 26(b) . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1969) (repealed 1970).
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extrajudicially." 1 30 One could imagine returning to the pre-1 970
version of the rule for discovery-intensive cases, requiring
parties to submit their discovery requests to the court, which
would then screen the requests for their propriety. Part of the
good-cause showing would not only be a demonstration of the
relevance of the information requested but an articulation of why
it is needed and how it would advance a resolution of the
claims. Certainly, having to convince a judge of the propriety of a
discovery request would chasten litigants in what they seek, at least
to a greater degree than the purely lawyer-directed discovery
approach-where judicial intervention in discovery disputes is rare
and often avoided.
To be sure, taking this approach would not be feasible
or warranted in most cases, given that judicial dockets
are overloaded and that most cases involve little discovery. 1 3 1
However, judges should be encouraged to identify cases in which
such prescreening of discovery requests would make sense. There
could also be a mechanism for parties to request such intervention.
When it is deemed that prescreening discovery requests would
be worthwhile but would be an overly time-intensive process
for the court, magistrates or discovery special masters could be
tasked with the job. Rule 1 6(c)(2) already provides district
judges with this authority. Specifically, Rule 1 6(c)(2)(F) empowers
a court to "take appropriate action" with respect to "controlling
and scheduling discovery, including orders affecting disclosures
and discovery under Rule 26 and Rules 29 through 37." 1 32 Further,
Rule 1 6(c)(2)(H) permits judges to take action with respect
to "referring matters to a magistrate judge or a master,"
which, of course, is buttressed by the authority given the court under
Rule 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636 for federal magistrate judges, and under
Rule 53 for masters. 1 3 3 Indeed, there are cases in which special
masters have been used to handle discovery; 1 34 under this suggestion,
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 1970 Amendment.
131. See Reda, supra note 8, at 1089 ("[At] the median, the reported costs of
discovery . . . constituted 1.6% of the reported stakes for plaintiffs and 3.3% of the
reported stakes for defendants.").
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(H), 53, 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012).
134. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 173, 174
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("After careful reflection, the court is satisfied that the magnitude
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however, their role would not be limited to post hoc resolution
of discovery disputes but rather to ex ante determinations regarding
the propriety of requested discovery. It is important to understand
that a blanket approach of prescreening is not being suggested,
for most cases do not have discovery warranting this
additional step. But for those that do, such pre-production
intervention by a neutral third party could be helpful in facilitating
m eaningful, tailored discovery requests that do not impose undue
expense.
B.

Loser-Pays Cost-Shifting

In addition to strengthening judicial involvement in
the discovery-request process in appropriate cases , it may be worth
considering whether post-adjudication cost-shifting would fairly
serve the interests of incentivizing appropriate and proportionate
discovery requests while pennitting an information exchange
that leads to a decision on the merits. As previously discussed,
Rule 54(d) ( l ) empowers courts to award "costs"--not including
attorneys' fees--to "the prevailing party." 13 5
Costs, in tum,
are defined in a very limited way in 28 U.S.C. § 1 920 to include the
following:
of the case, the complexity of the anticipated discovery problems, the sheer
volume of documents to be reviewed, many of which are subject to claims of
privilege, the number of witnesses to be de posed, the need for a speedy processing
of all discovery problems in order to meet the trial date established in this order, all
argue in favor of using a special master to s upervise discovery . . . .") .
1 35. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d)(l ) ("[C]osts-other than attorney's fees-should
be allowed to the prevailing party."). Compare this "prevailing party" language to
provisions that make attorney's fees available for those who "substantially
prevail." See, e.g. , Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(E)(i)-(ii)
(20 1 2) ("The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in
which the complainant has substantially prevailed."); Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(l)(A) (20 1 2) ("[In] any civil proceeding to
fo rfeit property under any provision of Federal law in which the claimant
substantially prevails, the United States shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant."). It is unclear to
what extent the slightly more liberal "substantially prevails" language impacts
litigant behavior versus the impact of the " prevailing party" language in cases to
which that latter standard applies.
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1 . Fees of the clerk and marshal;
2. Fees for printed or electronically recorded
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case;
3. Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
4. Fees for exemplification and the costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
5. Docket fees under section 1923 ofJhis title;
6. Compensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1 828 of this title. 1 36
Given the realities of electronic discovery, there may be
warrant for revising § 1920 to include a broader range of costs
associated with producing material in response to discovery
requests. 1 3 7 Rather than limiting reimbursable discovery costs
strictly to those arising from reproduction, the fuller range of
expenses connected with producing electronic discovery, such as the
search and retrieval process and associated e-discovery vendor costs,
would go much further in making a prevailing party whole. Further,
the prospect of having to pay such expenses in the event of defeat
should ensure that discovery requests are kept within the confines of
what would be truly meaningful to the case.
Unfortunately, many of the problems that would result from
moving to a requester-pays system would exist under a loser-pays
rule. The prospect of having to pay such expenses on the back-end
could over-deter discovery requests, leading requesting parties to fail
to seek information that would be useful to the case for fear of
having to pay. Further, for some plaintiffs in particular, there may be
no realistic ability for them to cover what could be hundreds of
1 36. 28 u.s.c. § 1 920 (20 1 2).
1 37. Note that my proposal for post hoc shifting of discovery expenses is
limited to expenses incurred responding to discovery requests; I am not suggesting
that expenses incurred in building one's own case be shifted.
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thousands of dollars or more in discovery expenses borne by their
opponents that prevail in the litigation. As a result, some legitimate
claims could be deterred altogether under such a regime.
Avoiding such an impact could be achieved in part by the
development of some sort of after-the-event litigation insurance that
one could purchase to cover the potential discovery-expense
liability. 1 3 8 Another approach, could be for judges in such cases to
be vigilant in making sure that the discovery expenses to be shifted
are themselves reasonable and not unduly trumped up by the party
who initially incurred them, an assessment courts already make
under circumstances when currently authorized cost-shifting
mechanisms are employed. 1 3 9 Additionally, an alleviating factor that
would practically minimize the actual burden placed on litigants by
post-judgment cost-shifting, would be the fact that the loser-pays
rule would only be invoked upon a judgment after a trial, not on a
summary judgment or other preliminary termination of the case (or,
at least the rule could be written in a way that so limited its
applicability). Judgments on verdicts after a trial are extremely
rare; 1 40 thus, the instances in which post hoc cost-shifting would

1 38. See Collin M. Davison, Fee Shifting And After-The-Event Insurance: A
Twist To A Thirteenth Century Approach To Shifting Attorneys ' Fees To Solve A
Twenty-First Century Problem, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1 1 99, 1 201-02 (20 1 1 )

("England has developed an insurance product known as after-the-event insurance
to provide funding for litigants who cannot afford the cost of the other party's
attorneys' fees should they be unsuccessful in litigation.").
1 39. For example:
[I]n arriving at an appropriate award of reasonable fees and costs, the
Court must strike a balance between the two considerations outlined
above: namely, (i) the extent to which Plaintiffs and their counsel devoted
excessive time and resources to the discovery effort at issue, and (ii) the
extent to which the conduct of the City and its counsel thwarted
Plaintiffs' reasonable attempts to secure the e-mails sought in their
discovery request or, failing that, to obtain relief from the City's
destruction of these emails.
Flagg v. City of Detroit, No. 05-74253, 201 1 WL 6 1 3 1 073, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec.
9, 20 1 1 ).
1 40. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS app. tbl. C-4 (20 1 4), available at http://www.uscourts.govNiewer
.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicia!CaseloadStatistics/20 l 4/tables/C04
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occur would be relatively rare as well. That said, the potential for
cost-shifting post-trial will necessarily factor into each litigant's
risk-reward assessment at earlier stages of litigation, which in turn
will likely impact whether and how a case settles. 1 4 1 There may be
other ways to blunt the potential of this proposal to over-deter
legitimate claims and discovery requests, such as vesting judges with
discretion to shift less than all (or none) of the discovery expenses to
the losing party based on factors such as ability to pay or the
reasonableness of the defeated claims or defenses. 1 42 But the
underlying propriety of the approach in terms of fairness seems
clear: After a party prevails in litigation, some degree of the costs
incurred in supplying material to the losing party in discovery should
be recoupable. Future research efforts should be designed to study
what the range of impacts of a post-hoc cost-shifting regime might
be and how they could be mitigated.
C.

Better Case Management

Before concluding, it must be urged that judges have within
their power the case-management tools necessary to address many of
the discovery cost concerns that defendants have today. Phased
discovery-which involves the prioritization of discovery with
Mar14.pdf (showing that for the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2014 only
1.2% of all civil cases reached trial).
141. See Laura Inglis et al., Experiments on the Effects of Cost-Shifting,
Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 89, 1 16 (2005) ("Our subjects tend to behave rationally when
confronted with changes in the magnitude of court costs. The overall settlement
rate under low costs was 58.7% compared to 77.7% under high costs. High costs
increased the number of settlements across all treatment variables. This suggests
that high court costs create strong incentives for settlement.").
142. Such a "j udge-centered" approach characterizes what is done in Israel;
their process and its impact was studied in Theodore Eisenberg et al., When Courts
Determine Fees in a System With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to
Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1452 (2013). The study' s
findings revealed that judges used their discretion in a variety of ways to vary how
post hoc cost-shifting was implemented across different categories of cases and
depending upon the nature of the parties involved. See id. at 1457-5 8 ("Our
findings suggest that Israeli j udges operate multiple de facto litigation cost
systems: a one-way shifting system that dominates in most tort cases; a loser pays
system that operates when publicly-owned corporations litigate; and a loser pays
system with discretion to deny litigation costs in all other cases.").
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respect to some matters whose resolution might eliminate the need
for later discovery-is a potential means of minimizing the burden
that producing parties will bear that courts should consider when
appropriate and useful. Parties are encouraged to consider phased
discovery within their discovery plans under Rule 26(f)(3)(B).
Judges can and should enter protective orders under Rule 502 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to reduce the costs associated with overly
meticulous pre-production privilege review. 143 Judges can require
parties to tailor their discovery requests in a manner that will reduce
the expense associated with responding to them. Pre-production
cost-shifting is already permitted under the Federal Rules if the
producing party is able to demonstrate undue burden; judges should
not shy away from recognizing these burdens and ordering cost
shifting or sharing when appropriate. 144 When shifting the costs
would be too burdensome for the requesting party to bear, judges can
help the parties reach an agreement regarding the requests or
protocols for identifying responsive material that might be able to
reduce these costs. Clearly, there will be cases in which high
discovery costs will be unavoidable and someone will have to bear
them, and there may be no solution for such cases. But there is
enough that can be done in most cases in which discovery is an issue
either under the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under
the approaches proposed above that recourse to an ex ante requester
pays rule would seem to be unnecessary.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The principal purpose of this Article is to address the nascent
argument that the producer-pays rule should be abandoned in favor
of a requester-pays rule for constitutional and policy reasons. What
is clear is that there is nothing unconstitutional about the producer
pays rule because unreasonable, inappropriate, or disproportionate
discovery requests can be blocked by recourse to a protective order
from the judge. Once declared to be within the scope of discovery
143. FED. R. Evrn. 502(d) advisory committee's note ("Confidentiality
orders are becoming increasingly important in limiting the costs of privilege
review and retention, especially in cases involving electronic discovery. ").
1 44. Recall that there is explicit authorization to order cost-sharing under
Rule 26(c)( l )(B) since amendments took effect on December 1 , 201 5.
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and otherwise reasonable given the needs of the case, the producing
party has had a hearing and no deprivation can be said to have
occurred under such circumstances. The policy argument against
moving to a requester-pays rule is equally strong: The over
deterrence of legitimate claims and appropriate discovery requests
would fundamentally undermine access to justice and the resolution
of disputes on their merits in ways that would ultimately compromise
the larger law-enforcement objectives of the civil justice system.
Less clear is what alternatives can be employed to address the
issue of excessive discovery expense when it is a problem in a case.
Absent any rule changes, it seems that judges or their delegees will
have to take responsibility for better policing this issue by shaping
discovery in a way that minimizes expense and cabins discovery
within confines that are reasonable given the needs of the case.
However, the labor-intensiveness of such an approach, plus the
potential for unduly constraining the ability of litigants to pursue
information they feel would be helpful to their litigation position,
may favor supplementing it with some form of post-judgment cost
shifting that requires the losing party to reimburse the winning party
for some portion of its discovery expenses. Whatever approach is
taken, let us hope that it is designed and implemented in a manner
consistent with the need to nurture, rather than thwart, access to civil
justice by those with legitimate claims.

